



Government of India
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

Preliminary Report: Serious Incident involving M/s Swiss International Air Line Airbus A330-343 aircraft, bearing registration HB-JHK at Delhi, India on 26 April 2026 (Indian Standard Time).

1. General Information

1.	Aircraft	Type	Airbus A330-343
		Nationality	Switzerland
		Registration	HB-JHK
2.	Owner and Operator	M/s Swiss International Air Lines Ltd.	
3.	Pilot-In-Command	Qualified on type with valid license	
	Extent of Injuries	Nil	
4.	First Officer	Qualified on type with valid license	
	Extent of Injuries	Nil	
5.	No. of Person on board	Total: 245; Crew: 13 and Passengers: 232	
	Extent of Injuries	04 Passengers received injuries during emergency evacuation.	
6.	Date & Time of serious incident	26 April 2026, 01:27 IST (25 April 2026, 1957 UTC)	
7.	Place of serious incident	Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport, New Delhi, India	
8.	Co-ordinates of serious incident Site	Latitude: 30° 38' 59.0" N, Longitude: 79° 00' 35.0" E	
9.	Last point of Departure	IGI Airport, New Delhi	
10.	Intended landing place	Zurich International Airport, Switzerland	
11.	Type of Operation	Scheduled Operations	
12.	Phase of Operation	Take-off Roll	

2. Notification of occurrence

On 26th April 2026 (IST), Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) received a notification from Operational Control Room, Airports Authority of India (AAI) regarding the occurrence involving Airbus A330-343 aircraft bearing registration HB-JHK belonging to M/s Swiss International Air Line at IGI Airport, New Delhi. It was notified that the aircraft HB-JHK was operating a Scheduled International flight

from New Delhi to Zurich and was involved in an occurrence of rejected take-off due to one engine failure at about 0127 Hrs IST at New Delhi.

The occurrence has been classified as a serious incident and an investigation has been ordered by DG, AAIB in exercise of power conferred to him by the Rule 11 (1) of the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2025.

As per the requirement of ICAO Annex 13 and the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents & Incidents) Rules, 2025, the Initial notification of the serious incident was sent to State of Registry and State of Design & Manufacture of the Aircraft which in this case is STSB, Switzerland and BEA, France respectively. STSB, Switzerland appointed an Accredited Representative and BEA, France appointed an Accredited Representative & Technical Advisers from Airbus and EASA to participate and assist in this investigation. The Initial Notification was also sent to the State of Design & Manufacture of Engine which in this case is BFU, Germany and AAIB, UK respectively. BFU, Germany and AAIB, UK appointed an Accredited Representative each along with a Technical Adviser from Rolls Royce to participate and assist in this investigation.

3. Aircraft Information

Aircraft Model	Airbus A330-343
Aircraft Serial No.	1276
Year of Manufacture	2012
Name of Owner/Operator	Swiss International Air Lines Ltd.
C of R (Certificate of Registration)	Valid (as on date of incident)
C of A (Certificate of Airworthiness)	Valid (as on date of incident)
Category	Large Aeroplane
C of A Validity	Issued on 11.01.2012 with no expiry/ validity date
ARC (Airworthiness Review Certificate) issued on	06.05.2025
ARC valid up to	02.06.2026
Aircraft Empty Weight	124,526 kg
Maximum Take-off Weight	235,000 kg
Date of Aircraft weighing	26.03.2025
Max Usable Fuel	97,530 litres
Max Payload with full fuel	27, 866 kg
Empty weight Centre of Gravity (CG)	35.819 meters
Next Weighing due on	26.03.2029
Total Aircraft (Airframe) Hours	65,563:20 Flight Hours
Last Major Inspection	C-Check performed on 31.03.2025
Engine Type	Rolls-Royce RB211 Trent 772B-60/16
Date of Manufacture (LH)	25.04.2009
Engine Sl. No. (LH)	41643

Last Maintenance Inspection (LH)	Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) task 723400-R3-1 – General Visual Inspection (GVI) of fan track & cold stream duct on 21.04.2026.
Total Engine Hours/ Cycles (LH)	75,524:48 TSN (Time Since New) 11,369 CSN (Cycles Since New)
Date of Manufacture (RH)	27.11.2011
Engine Sl. No. (RH)	42007
Last Maintenance Inspection (RH)	MPD task 723400-R3-1- GVI of fan track & cold stream duct on 12.03.2026
Total Engine Hours/ Cycles (RH) TSN/CSN (Time/Cycles Since New)	60,423:45 TSN 8,837 CSN
Aeromobile License & validity	Issued on 11 July 2025 and valid as on date of Incident

The last engine overhaul/shop visit in respect of the involved engine i.e. the LH Engine was on 30 May 2016 at 35593 Hrs TSN/5683 CSN. Thereafter, the engine has operated for 39,935:48 Hrs and 5686 cycles before the incident on 26 April 2026.

4. Crew information

The flying experience and the latest checks in respect of the cockpit crew operating the incident flight is given below.

	Pilot-In-Command	First Officer
Endorsements as PIC	JULY 2014	-
Total flying experience	18633:06 Hrs	2173:59 Hrs
Total flying experience on type	5354:32 Hrs	789:32 Hrs
Total flying experience on type as PIC	3460:42 Hrs	-
Last flown on type	19.04.2026	20.04.2026 - 21.04.2026
Total flying experience during last 01 year	434:19 Hrs	610:56 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 6 Months	214:26 Hrs	314:13 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 90 Days	115:46 Hrs	189:43 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 30 Days	56:24 Hrs	50:40 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 07 Days	16:15 Hrs	16:15 Hrs
Total flying experience during last 24 Hours	NIL	NIL
Rest period before flight	5 local nights (118:37 Hrs)	3 Local Nights (75:53 Hrs)
Date of Latest Flight Checks	Line Evaluation: 30.04.2025	Line Evaluation: 01.02.2026

Both the cockpit crew were qualified to operate the flight.

5. Meteorological Information

The weather information during the time of occurrence was obtained for Delhi Airport. Following was the weather information reported at IGI Airport, Delhi between 0100 IST to 0200 IST.

Time (IST)	Wind (°/Knots)	Visibility (Meters)	QNH	Temperature (°C)	Dew point (°C)	Weather
0100	220/03	4500	1006	32	14	HAZE
0130	CALM	4000	1006	31	15	HAZE
0200	210/02	4000	1006	30	14	HAZE

6. Damage to aircraft

6.1 Visual Inspection

A walk around inspection of the aircraft was carried out by the investigation team post the serious incident and following salient observations were made:

- Small Metal particles/debris were observed at the exhaust section/ CNA of engine # 1. See Figure 1 below.




Figure 1

- Soot/burn marks were observed on the engine pylon structure just behind the exhaust section. See Figure 2 below.




Figure 2

- No damages were observed on the engine fan blades.
- There was no damage observed on the aircraft structure other than a small dent observed on either side of the fuselage probably associated with the deployment of the emergency slides.

6.2 Borescope Inspection (BSI)

A borescope inspection of the involved engine # 1 was carried out in its in-situ position. Following is the salient observation.

External observation before start of BSI

- Broken bolts and spacers of HP/IP bearing support found in thrust reverser ducts.
- HP Bleed valves were found partially blocked with debris.

Core Engine BSI observation

- Damages were observed in High Pressure Turbine (HPT) blades and Nozzle Guide Vanes (NGV).
- HP shaft was seized and was unable to fully inspect.
- Damages were observed in Intermediate Pressure Turbine (IPT) blades.
- IP shaft was seized and was unable to fully inspect.
- Damages were observed in Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) blades.
- Damages were observed in High Pressure Compressor (HPC) blades and Stator vanes.
- HP shaft was seized and was unable to fully inspect.
- No signs of impact damage or blade distortion were found in Intermediate Pressure Compressor (IPC).
- IPC shaft was seized and was unable to inspect fully.

The damages to the engine # 1 were confined to the core of the engine, however, due to the HP and IP spools not being able to be rotated, it was not possible to identify the cause of the engine failure with the BSI inspection. Further, there was no evidence of any uncontained failure.

7. Flight Recorders

Both the flight recorders i.e. Solid-State Flight Data Recorders (SSFDR) and Solid-State Cockpit Voice Recorder (SSCVR) were removed from the aircraft for data recovery and further analysis.

The details of the flight recorders installed in the aircraft are as follows: -

- SSFDR
Make: Honeywell
Part Number: 980-4700-042
Serial Number: SSFDR-17288
- SSCVR
Make: Honeywell
Part Number: 980-6022-001
Serial Number: CVR120-14811

Both SSFDR and SSCVR were found in good condition. The data from both the units have been downloaded and are being analyzed for corroborating with other evidences to identify the probable cause(s)/contributory factor(s) leading to the event.

8. Brief description of the incident Flight

8.1 Previous flight, LX146, Zurich to Delhi on 25 April 2026

Prior to the incident flight, the aircraft HB-JHK operated flight LX146 i.e. sector Zurich to Delhi on 25 April 2026. The flight was uneventful and no abnormality was reported on the aircraft by the operating crew. There was a total of seven complaints raised after the flight which were generic in nature and none of them were related to engine or aircraft systems or anything related to serviceability/controllability of the aircraft. All the seven complaints were addressed and the aircraft was released for the next flight without any complaints pending.

8.2 The incident flight

On 26 April 2026, the aircraft HB-JHK was scheduled to operate the return flight i.e. LX147 from Delhi to Zurich. There were 232 passengers along with 13 crew members on board. No abnormality was reported on the aircraft during the pre-flight inspection.

The aircraft was parked at stand A14. At 010021 IST, the aircraft requested for the start-up and pushback. The SMC controller asked the aircraft to expect 06 minutes delay. Thereafter, at 010730 IST, the aircraft was given start-up and pushback clearance and was asked to start-up abeam bay A12. The same was readback by the aircraft. At 011515 IST, the aircraft informed the SMC that they are ready for taxi and on the request made by the crew, the aircraft was given taxi clearance via link 32 – C - M - link 30 – J6 holding point runway 28. The aircraft was then instructed to hold at holding point J6 and at 012330 IST asked the aircraft to change over to tower frequency.

At 012424 IST, the aircraft came in contact with tower and informed that they are ready for departure at holding point J6. At 012556 IST, the aircraft was given take-off clearance from runway 28 and the tower informed winds as 210⁰/01 Knot. The same was readback by the crew. The crew thereafter commenced the take-off roll. At 012721, the crew informed tower that they are stopping on runway and requested for fire brigade due to one engine failure. As per the ASMGCS (Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System) recording, the aircraft was observed to have attained a maximum speed of about 106 knots before the take-off was rejected. The aircraft stopped between Taxiway G2 and Taxiway G1.

A Follow Me (FM) jeep which was maintaining listening watch reached the aircraft first followed by a CFT (Crash Fire Tender). The aircraft subsequently informed tower controller that it was getting smoke fire indication and asked for visuals. The tower controller informed the aircraft that a CFT was on Runway. The aircraft then enquired with tower controller whether they can see any fire on the Engine No. 1 on Left hand side and the same was asked from CFT for confirmation. CFT reported that it was behind the aircraft and is checking for fire.

The aircraft again asked the controller to ascertain if there was any smoke or fire in the engine. The controller responded that it will confirm. The Controller again asked CFT to confirm whether there is any fire. However, the FM jeep reported that there is smoke on left side landing gear. The aircraft acknowledged and further asked to be towed to vacate the runway (RWY). Thereafter, FM jeep reported fire also on right landing gear. The tower Controller acknowledged and asked the aircraft if it had copied the information, to which the aircraft enquired whether the fire is in Landing gear. The tower Controller responded affirmatively and informed that CFT was behind the aircraft. FM jeep informed the aircraft that CFT is extinguishing the fire.

At time 0135 IST, full emergency was declared and FM jeep reported only smoke, no fire. The aircraft confirmed only smoke, FM jeep responded affirmatively and informed that water is being splashed on undercarriage, the aircraft acknowledged. Shortly thereafter, FM jeep asked the aircraft to shut down engine and informed there is fire on right side landing gear. The tower controller also instructed the aircraft to switch off engine, the aircraft acknowledged and informed that both the Engines were off. Thereafter, FM jeep informed the tower controller that there is fire on right side landing gear and from left side only smoke was coming. The tower controller conveyed the message to the aircraft.

Thereafter, emergency evacuation of passengers was carried out on runway itself. All the 07 slides (except one) were used for evacuating the passengers. At 0150 IST, FM jeep informed that the fire is extinguished totally and the passengers are on ground. During the process of emergency evacuation four passengers were reported to have received injuries. They were immediately taken for medical treatment.



Figure 3: The aircraft on runway with emergency slides deployed.

At 0324 IST, the FM jeep informed tower controller that the aircraft was ready for tow. The controller approved towing and vacation of runway. At 0339 IST, the FM jeep informed that the aircraft is fully parked at Bay. At time 0450 IST, full emergency was terminated.

The salient ASMGCS snapshots depicting the aircraft position with sequence of events is provided in Annexure 'A' of the report.

8.3 Post Flight Report (PFR)

As per the PFR report generated after the event, the first fault generated was "ENG 1 Stall" at 1957 UTC/0127 IST during roll out phase followed by "F/CTL RUD TRIM 1 FAULT", "AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT", "ENG 1 FAIL" and ENG 1 REV UNLOCKLED". The "ENG 1 SHUTDOWN" message came at 1958 UTC/0128 IST.

As per the initial crew report, take-off roll began on RWY 28 intersection J6. At approximately 110 KTS engine 1 failed with a large bang and spitting a large flame forward which was visible from the cockpit. The aircraft veered to the left and the crew decided to abort the take-off. After the aircraft came to a full stop, they informed the tower accordingly and began to apply the ECAM checklist until engine 1 was secured. Subsequently, cabin crew reported black smoke observed beneath the wing, and the fire brigade was requested. Further, it was reported that one fire bottle was discharged for ENG 1 and the maximum EGT was recorded to be 600° C. Also, brakes on the left side reached 600° C before fire tender sprayed the foam on left landing gear.

9. Progress of the Investigation


- i Initial assessment of the aircraft has been carried out.
- ii The aircraft & flight related documents have been collected.
- iii Initial statement of flight crew has been obtained for further analysis.
- iv The data from the flight recorders have been downloaded for further analysis.
- v The involved engine will be retrieved from the aircraft for further detailed examination to identify the root cause of its failure.
- vi ATC records along with controller statements have been obtained and are being analysed.

- vii The investigation team is in co-ordination with Accredited Representatives & Technical Advisors for further course of action to identify the root cause(s)/contributory factor(s).
- viii Maintenance and operational records pertaining to the aircraft were obtained from the operator and are being analysed.
- ix Records obtained from various stakeholders are currently being scrutinized.


10. Interim safety recommendations

AAIB does not intend to issue any safety recommendations at this stage. However, AAIB may issue interim safety recommendations at any stage of the investigation whenever it considers that necessary preventive measures are required to be taken promptly to enhance aviation safety.

ASMGCS SCREENSHOT




1. Aircraft at Holding point J6, RWY 28.




2. Aircraft Commenced roll.

The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident by Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to apportion blame or liability. The information is preliminary and subject to change.




3. Aircraft Abandoned Take-off.




4. Aircraft Stopped on RWY 28 between taxiway G2 & G1.

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


5. Passengers evacuated with CFT & FM Jeep on runway.



6. The aircraft Vacating Runway.

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7. Aircraft Parked at Bay 254 accompanied by FM Jeep & CFT.

***** END OF REPORT *****